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Abstract
The recent empirical growth literature has proposed three underlying fun-
damental determinants of economic growth, namely, physical geography,
economic integration, and institutional quality. This paper unpacks the
final determinant into both political-economic institutions as well as the
primarily political institution of democratic development. Using both
cross-sectional and panel datasets, we show that, properly instrumented,
there is no evidence that democracies grow faster or slower than non-
democracies. This result is in contrast to much of the more recent litera-
ture, which tend to find a weakly positive relationship. Political economic
institutions, however, remain positive and significant determinants of eco-
nomic growth, which corroborates much of the empirical evidence in the
existing literature.
Keywords: Economic growth, institutions, democracy
JEL Classification: O17, O47, P51
∗Centre College and the World Bank, respectively. Emails: jessica.decker@centre.edu and
jlim@worldbank.org (corresponding author). We are indebted to many helpful conversations
and comments by Jonathon Adams-Kane, Joshua Aizenman, Kay Pommerenke, and an anony-
mous referee (who suggested the System GMM approach). Thanks are also due to Dani Rodrik
for kindly providing data. Financial support for this project was in part from funding from
the Faculty Development Committee, Centre College (Decker and Lim), and the Graduate
Division, University of California, Santa Cruz (Lim). The standard disclaimers apply. All
errors and omissions remain firmly in our domain.
1 Introduction
The recent literature on the underlying “fundamental” determinants1 of eco-
nomic growth has developed around three main strands: the influence of phys-
ical geography, primarily through its impact on agriculture and health (Dia-
mond 1997; Sachs 2001); the role of economic integration in driving convergence
(Frankel & Romer 1999; Sachs & Warner 1995); and the power of institutional
quality in the determination of economic growth outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson
& Robinson 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 2004). Each of these factors is
likely to be important in its own right; nonetheless, the primacy of institutions
appears to have been overwhelmingly accepted by most researchers working in
the area. As Rodrik et al. (2004, pp. 135,141) claim triumphantly, “the qual-
ity of institutions trumps everything else. . . [i]nstitutions trump geography and
openness.”2
Part of the problem of satisfactorily identifying the channels of transmission
is precisely the complexity of interactions between each of these constituent
factors. The issue, therefore, boils down to the choice of instruments used for
each deep determinant.3 The literature has introduced several instruments to
this effect. The distance from the equator and malarial risk are often used as
instruments for gauging the impact of physical geography. Economic integration
is instrumented with the predicted trade/GDP share, as determined by the
gravity equation. Instruments for institutional quality include the mortality
rate of colonial settlers and the extent of (English and European) ethnolinguistic
fractionalization within the population.
The success of empirical work in establishing the centrality of institutions
nonetheless raises another important question: What sorts of institutions matter
for growth? After all, the notion of institutions pursued in the literature is
1As opposed to “proximate” determinants found in extended Solow-style growth regressions
(Mankiw, Romer & Weil 1992), such as the capital-labor ratio and human capital.
2This does not diminish the view of a small minority who continue to argue for the impor-
tance of geographic factors. Sachs (2003, p. 10), for example, continues to argue that “[t]here
is good theoretical and empirical reason to believe that the development process reflects a
complex interaction of institutions, policies, and geography.”
3There is also reason to believe that data format—whether time series or cross-sectional—
might influence the results as well. Time series and panel data are more likely to capture the
dynamic determination of per capita income and growth, while cross-sectional data are more
suitable for estimating static levels of national income.
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diverse. Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) draw a distinction between property rights
and contracting institutions, and find that the former dominates in terms of
its effect on long-run economic growth. Persson & Tabellini (2006) instead
consider parliamentary versus presidential systems of representation, and find
that presidential systems tend to grow faster. Glaeser, La Porta, Lo´pez-de
Silanes & Shleifer (2004) make the argument that the pertinent distinction is
that between institutional quality as opposed to constraints.
In contrast to these papers, we argue that the key difference is one be-
tween political-economic and political institutions. More specifically, we regard
the political-economic institutions that govern economic norms and rules—
legal frameworks, bureaucratic efficacy, curbs on corruption, and the regula-
tory burden—as distinct from political institutions, which is primarily that
of democratic representation. While weak political-economic institutions are
likely to impose real costs on economic relationships in society, features of a
democratic political regime—such as checks and balances, electoral rules, and
federalism—seem to be of secondary importance to economic life. In addition,
sound political-economic institutions could conceivably exist in predominantly
non-democratic settings; countries that appear to exhibit such qualities would
include Singapore, Tunisia, and Jordan. Therefore, while the finer distinctions
made by Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) and Persson & Tabellini (2006) are inter-
esting in their own right, we regard our distinction as more fundamental.
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on the different fundamental
drivers of economic growth. In particular, our distinction between political-
economic and political institutions allows us to determine if economies exhibit-
ing either of the two—or both—are more likely to experience superior or in-
ferior economic performance, while controlling for geographic endowment and
economic integration. Using both cross-sectional as well as panel datasets, we
find that while institutions are significant predictors of economic performance,
democracy is not. This result is robust to a range of specifications and measures,
and is stable across both sets of data.
The debate on the complementarities between economic and political free-
dom, which in turn spurs growth, goes back to Hayek (1944) and Friedman
(1962). More recently, Barro (1996) has explored the manner in which democ-
racy can serve as a fundamental determinant of economic growth, and the papers
in the volume edited by Rivera-Batiz & Rivera-Batiz (2002) argue that political
participation may evoke economic development in and of itself.
A priori, there is little reason to believe that democratic nations should nec-
essarily grow faster or slower than their non-democratic counterparts. Indeed,
a quick glance at the bilateral data alone (Figure 1) suggests that it is difficult
to discern if there exists any clear relationship between GDP per capita and the
level of democratic development. Theory, in and of itself, offers little help. Prze-
worski & Limongi (1993) provide four main channels whereby democracy affects
economic growth: First, it offers protection from a predatory autonomous au-
thoritarian ruler (positive); second, it potentially unleashes pressures for imme-
diate consumption, thus undermining investment and growth (negative); third,
it removes the insulation of the state from particularistic pressures (ambiguous);
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and fourth, it may have an influence on property rights, which in turn might
have a role to play in fostering growth (ambiguous).
Formal models that seek to clarify these channels exist. Using a general equi-
librium, endogenous growth model, Rivera-Batiz (2002) shows that democracy
raises growth by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. This constraint,
in turn, stimulates technological change and thus spurs economic growth. In
the model of Persson & Tabellini (1994), redistributive (distortionary) taxa-
tion in democracies leads to a deceleration of growth due to a depression of
after-tax return to private investment. Alesina & Rodrik (1994) approach the
problem using a model where growth occurs through public and private sec-
tor investment in physical capital. They obtain a similar prediction: Voting in
democracies lead to a choice of a tax rate on capital that is to the right of the
growth-maximizing one. Thus, there is an inverse relationship between inequal-
ity and growth, and—assuming a median-voter mechanism—this implies that
democracies should tend to grow slower. Moreover, special interest pressures
in democracies can lead to rent-seeking, which results in inefficient equilibrium
outcomes, undermining growth (Parente 2006).
These findings, however, are not definitive. A monotonically positive rela-
tion between growth and inequality/democracy is possible if voting leads to a
higher expenditure on public education (financed by nondistortionary taxation),
which then fuels growth (Verdier & Saint-Paul 1993). Acemoglu & Robinson
(2000) model the aforementioned ambiguity of democracy on growth through
the positive impact of majority voting on the expansion of education and hence
a country’s stock of human capital, mitigated by the negative impact of growth-
retarding systems of income redistribution.4 Finally, Gradstein (2007) models
democracies as supportive for protection of private property rights, thus ensur-
ing larger investment and higher growth.
The empirical literature on the relationship between democracy and growth
is large. Most early studies are mixed: Some find that democratic regimes tend
to grow faster (Knack & Keefer 1995), while others report a weakly signifi-
cant negative relationship (Barro 1996).5 These earlier studies, are, however,
racked with measurement, estimation, and endogeneity problems (Przeworski &
Limongi 1993). More specifically, the measurement of democracy and economic
growth is plagued by potential reverse causality problems. For example, greater
economic integration and institutional quality may imply a superior environ-
ment for the development of democracy; furthermore, economic development
may plant the seed of democratic reform. At the same time, democratic out-
comes may well have an impact on the rate of economic growth, as discussed
above.
4Glaeser et al. (2004) have made the case that it is in fact human capital that leads
to institutional improvements, and not the other way round. Our view is that while human
capital may be a predictor of democratic development, it is far from clear that it is a convincing
fundamental, as opposed to proximate, determinant of economic growth.
5In a review of the empirical literature on democracy and growth, Brunetti (1997) finds
that the evidence is very truly mixed: Of the seventeen papers considered, those that find
either positive or negative effects number four each, while the remainder find no effect.
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More recent research has taken these charges more seriously. Henisz (2000)
employs three-stage least squares to examine how political constraints shape
growth, while Vega-Gordillo & A´ lvarez Arce (2003) consider how economic
and political freedom (Granger) cause growth. Rodrik & Wacziarg (2005) ex-
amine the growth effects of democratic transitions using fixed effects models,
while Persson & Tabellini (2007) exploit propensity matching to consider such
regime changes. Both find a positive effect of democratic transitions on growth
outcomes. In a slightly different vein, Mobarak (2005) establishes a positive re-
lationship between democracy and growth volatility. The work that is probably
most closely associated with the approach of this study is that of Butkiewicz &
Yanikkaya (2006). In particular, the authors consider decomposing institutions
into measures associated with either rule of law or democracy. However, while
their paper considers institutions in significant detail, measures of integration
are given short shrift, and geography is not considered at all. This highlights a
more general difference: While differing in estimation strategies, most of these
papers introduce democracy into a vector of proximate covariates, as opposed
to the fundamental determinants approach adopted here.
The main empirical contributions of this study are twofold. First, we account
for endogeneity in the cross section by introducing several new instruments for
democracy. We consider three potential instruments: government fractionaliza-
tion, military spending as a fraction of government expenditures, and predicted
democracy levels. Why? Democracies are likely to demonstrate greater lev-
els of political participation than totalitarian regimes (Usher 1981). Similarly,
healthy democracies tend to have a lower level of military spending as share
of government expenditures (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson & Smith
1999). Finally, by utilizing predicted democracy levels from a regression based
on determinants of democracy, we are able to obtain a potentially strong instru-
ment that is highly correlated with actual quantitative or qualitative measures
of democracy.
Second, we address endogeneity in the panel by using lagged values of the en-
dogenous variables as instruments for the variables themselves. This is possible
in a panel setting, since lags of the regressors are orthogonal to the error term
and can hence serve as valid instruments. By drawing instruments from within
the dataset, we are able to extend the inferences concerning the fundamental
determinants to a much larger sample.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will provide an
overview of the empirical model used in the present study. This is followed by a
discussion of the dataset, estimation technique, and the main results (Section 3).
A final section concludes the paper with some reflections on the findings.
2 Empirical Model
The main empirical model is a variant of that in Rodrik et al. (2004), to
accommodate dynamic features. The core specification for the (fundamental
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determinants-based) growth regression is:
log yit = αyi,t−1 + β0 + β1INSit + β2INTit + β3GEOi + β4DEMit + εit (1)
where |α| < 1, yit is the per capita income in country i at time t, INSit, INTit,
GEOi, and DEMit are the deep determinants of institutional quality, economic
integration, physical geography, and democratic development, respectively, and
εit is an error term given by
εit = µi + ηit, (2)
which comprises both fixed effects µi and idiosyncratic ηit components, and
E (µi) = E (ηit) = E (µiηit) = 0, E (ηisηit) = 0 ∀s 6= t, and E (yi1ηit) = 0 ∀t =
2, . . . , T .
When we constrain time to a single period, (1) simplifies to an extended
version of the special case considered in Rodrik et al. (2004):6
log yi = β0 + β1INSi + β2INTi + β3GEOi + β4DEMi + εi.
Identification is achieved in this static model with first-stage regressions using
exogenous instruments given by
INSi = φ0 + φ1SMi + φ2CONSTi + φ3DEMDEVi + φ4GEOi + υi (3a)
INTi = θ0 + θ1CONSTi + θ2SMi + θ3DEMDEVi + θ4GEOi + νi (3b)
DEMi = λ0 + λ1DEMDEVi + λ2SMi + λ3CONSTi + λ4GEOi + ζi (3c)
where SMi is a measure of settler mortality utilized by Acemoglu, Johnson
& Robinson (2001) as an instrument for institutional quality, CONSTi is the
predicted trade volume according to a gravity specification, used by Frankel
& Romer (1999) as an instrument for economic integration, and DEMDEVi
is an instrument for the level of democratic development of a country, which
is one of the following: (a) Government fractionalization as proxied by the
Herfindahl Index of government; (b) Military spending as a fraction of total
government expenditures; and (c) Predicted level of democracy, estimated using
the specification of Barro (1999), which for convenience is reproduced here:
DEMDEVit = ψ0 +ψ1DEMDEVi,t−T +ψ2DEMDEVi,t−2T +ψ3Xi,t−T + ξit,
where, for country i at time t, the current level of democratic development,
DEMDEVit is determined by the previous levels of democratic development,
lagged by T or 2T periods (where T is taken to be 5 years), and Zi,t−T is a
vector of previous-period variables that influence the extent of democracy, and
ξit is a random error term. The Xi,t−T vector used in this paper follows the
6Note that we have chosen to drop the lagged dependent variable from the right hand side of
(1). This is both to remain consistent with Rodrik et al. (2004), as well as for practical reasons:
Given the significant lags that are likely to operate with respect to these deep determinants
of growth, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the static model is likely to swamp
the subtle effects that would otherwise be picked up.
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baseline specification of Barro (1999, p. S165), which includes the logarithm of
real per capita GDP 5 years prior, measures of educational attainment 5 years
prior (specifically, these are the years of primary schooling for persons aged 25
and over, and the gap between the years of primary school attainment between
males and females aged 25 and over), a measure of the urbanization rate 5 years
prior, a measure of country size given by the logarithm of the 5-year earlier
population level, and a dummy for oil-exporting countries.7
In order to identify the dynamic model, we exploit its temporal nature to
retrieve an instrument set based on the lags of the endogenous variables:
Zi =
[
0 0
0 Wi
]
, Wi = [diag (∆Wi,t+1 · · ·∆Wi,T )] , (4)
where Wit = [INSit INTit DEMit] are the time-varying deep determinants,
and we supplement Zi (in levels) with the purely exogenous (time-invariant) in-
strumentGEOi and (in some specifications) time dummiesTi = [t, t+ 1, . . . , T ].
The instrument matrix Zi, together with the exogenous instruments GEOi and
Ti, correspond to a set of moment conditions that can be used in the estimation
process using generalized method of moments (GMM).
As stressed by Rodrik et al. (2004), the core specification given by (1), (3),
and (4) represent a natural framework for estimating the impact of the deep de-
terminants of institutional quality, economic integration, geographic influences,
and democratic development. The symmetry in this specification allows each
variable an equal chance of exerting an influence on the economic development
of any given country.
3 Estimation Findings
3.1 Datasets
We make use of two distinct datasets, corresponding to each of the two main
estimation procedures. The single-period cross-section is an augmented version
of that used in Rodrik et al. (2004), and so the finer details will not be repeated
here. The data comprise up to 91 countries for the year 1995. For completeness,
we will briefly discuss the key variables.
Institutional quality is measured by a composite indicator (ranging from -
2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating stronger institutions) that captures,
inter alia, property rights protection and rule of law, provided by Kaufmann,
Kraay & Mastruzzi (2007); it is instrumented by the mortality rate of soldiers,
bishops, and sailors in European colonies between the 17th and 19th centuries
(Acemoglu et al. 2001) and the extent of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Hall
& Jones 1999). Economic integration is proxied by an openness measure of
7See Table 1 of Barro (1999), and the discussion from pp. S164–S166. Note that Barro
uses two indices of democratic development as dependent variables: Electoral rights and civil
liberties, obtained from Freedom House. In this paper we have instead used a composite
democracy index provided by Marshall & Jaggers (2005).
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the ratio of trade to GDP, measured in real PPP terms (Heston, Summers &
Aten 2006), and is instrumented with predicted bilateral aggregate trade shares,
as estimated by a variant of the gravity equation (Frankel & Romer 1999).
Geography is itself a natural instrument, and in the benchmark cross-section,
it is taken to be the latitudinal distance from the equator of the capital city, as
provided by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
The actual level of democracy is taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall
& Jaggers 2005). The instruments are: (a) the Herfindahl Index of government,
which is the sum of squared seat shares of all parties in the government (higher
values suggest a more unified government and hence lower levels of democratic
participation), and is provided by the World Bank database of political insti-
tutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer & Walsh 2001); (b) Military spending as a
share of total government expenditure from the WDI; and (c) predicted level of
democracy. The variables used for the vector of controls X are from Barro &
Lee (1996) (educational attainment measures), the World Bank WDI, and the
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Lagged democracy levels utilize
the 1985 and 1990 levels of democracy from the Policy IV dataset.
The predicted level of democracy was regressed on a subset of the data for
which observations for the independent variables were available. As a simple
robustness check, two specifications for the democracy regression were run: (D1 )
A leaner model that includes just lagged democracy variables, income per capita,
and a measure of educational attainment; and (D2 ) The baseline model of Barro
(1999), as discussed above. The results are reproduced in Table 1.
In general, the regression provided a reasonable fit (adjusted R2 for the
preferred specification (D2 ) was 0.524). With the exception of the 10-year
lagged democracy level, log GDP per capita, and the oil country dummy, the
coefficients had the expected signs, similar to that of Barro (1999). Since the
latter two (GDP and oil dummy) coefficients were statistically insignificant, the
expected signs were not major issues. Moreover, the point estimate for the 10-
year lag of democracy was relatively small, and only marginally significant, and
its unexpected sign is unlikely to affect the value of the predicted democracy as
an instrument.
Table 2 summarizes the quality of the instruments used in a correlation ma-
trix. As can be seen, the predicted democracy instrument is by far the superior
instrument for actual democracy levels; as such, it will be the instrument of
choice for the bulk of the cross-sectional estimations. This strong relationship
is also captured in Figure 2. Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of the
relationship between the various instruments and GDP per capita.
The multi-period panel comprises 128 countries between the years 1984–
2002, for an unbalanced panel of up to 2,091 observations. The integration,
geography, and democracy measures were obtained from the same sources (He-
ston et al. (2006), the WDI, and Marshall & Jaggers (2005), respectively). Un-
fortunately, the composite governance measure used for institutional quality in
the cross-section Kaufmann et al. (2007) is only available for seven discontin-
uous years (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002–2006), and so is not well suited for panel
analysis. We substitute the institutional measure with an alternative measure
9
Table 1: Determinants of democracy†
(D1 ) (D2 )
5-year lag 0.558 0.530
of democracy (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.12)∗∗∗
10-year lag -0.013 0.003
of democracy (0.07) (0.06)
Log GDP -0.074 -0.095
per capita (0.07) (0.06)
Gap between male/female -0.021 -0.019
primary schooling (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗
Years of primary 0.010
schooling (0.06)
Urbanization rate -0.037
(0.04)
Log population -0.012
(0.04)
Oil country dummy -0.105
(0.12)
Constant 1.605 2.061
(0.56)∗∗∗ (0.82)∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.536 0.524
N 93 93
†
Notes: Huber-White (robust) standard errors reported in
parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗
indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates sig-
nificance at 1 percent level. A constant term was included in
the regressions, but not reported.
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compiled from the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Services
2003), which spans a much longer period (1984–2002). This composite indica-
tor (ranging from 0 to 3.9, with higher values indicating stronger institutions)
accounts for, inter alia, the quality of bureaucracy and rule of law.8
3.2 Estimation Methodology
To address the econometric issues raised in the introduction, the model in (1)
is estimated with two estimation procedures that take into account endogeneity
concerns: (a) Instrumental variables using two-stage least squares (2SLS); and
(b) System General Method of Moments (System GMM) (Arellano & Bover
1995; Blundell & Bond 1998).9 These approaches correspond, respectively, to
the static and dynamic versions of (1).
The predicted bilateral trade volume instrument was constructed by esti-
mating the gravity model using standard panel regression techniques (Frankel
& Romer 1999). The democratic development instrument was estimated with
OLS.10 The cross-sectional growth regressions were estimated with both OLS
and 2SLS with instrumental variables, while the panel growth regressions were
estimated with OLS, fixed effects, and System GMM.
Static regressions controlled for heteroskedasticity with Huber-White robust
standard errors, and panel estimates controlled for both heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. Panel estimates also made finite sample corrections and applied
the forward orthogonal deviations transform, which preserves sample size given
the unbalanced nature of the panel.
3.3 Static Model Results
As discussed in the introduction, there is no clear reason why democracies need
necessarily exert a direct impact on economic performance. Table 3 divides the
sample into democracies and non-democracies and provides summary statistics
for the two groups for the key variables of interest, real GDP per capita. The
numbers underscore the ambiguity of the data: While democracies as a group
appear to have a higher mean real GDP per capita, they also demonstrate a
wider range of performances. Furthermore, the lowest level of GDP per capita
among democracies (corresponding to Uruguay) is lower than the lowest among
non-democracies (corresponding to Rwanda).
Table 4 reports our benchmark results. These are: (C1 ) OLS regression of
GDP per capita on institutions, integration, geography, and democracy given by
8In any event, the correlation between these two measures is very strong: 0.88, significant
at 1 percent.
9Due to the time invariance of the integration variable, and its importance in the core spec-
ification (1), it is not possible to use the alternative—and more popular—difference estimator
(Arellano & Bond 1991).
10Barro (1999) actually uses the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method, which al-
lows for the error term in country i at time t to be correlated with the error terms of the
same country at a different time t′. Since the estimation only required predicted democratic
development values for one year (1995), OLS was sufficient for our purposes.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for GDP per capita for
cross-section†
Democratic Nondemocratic
Mean 8.750 7.893
Standard deviation 1.062 0.724
Minimum 6.532 6.771
Maximum 10.233 9.066
N 65 26
†
Notes: Democracies were classified as those with democracy
level greater than 5, on a scale of 0–10, as given in the Polity
IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2005).
the special case of (1); (C2 ) IV regression with settler mortality and government
fractionalization as instruments for institutions and democracy, respectively;
(C3 ) Specification (C2 ), but with democracy instrumented by military expen-
diture; (C4 ) (C2 ), but with democracy instrumented by predicted democracy;
(C5 ) (C2 ), with democracy instrumented by the all three democratic develop-
ment instruments; (C6 )–(C8 ) Analogous regressions to (C2 )–(C4 ), but with
ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instruments for institutions.
There are several points worth noting about the static model findings. First,
the results for the prominence of institutions echo as in the findings of Rodrik
et al. (2004): In six of the eight specifications, institutional quality exerts a
positive and statistically significant influence on economic growth. The effect is
also economically significant: The average of the coefficient on all specifications
is 1.135, implying that a one-point increase in institutional quality increases
GDP per capita in the excess of a hundred percent. Moreover, Hansen J-test
diagnostics suggest that, with the exception of (C8 ) (and marginally for (C7 )),
the use of additional instruments did not lead to overidentification, which lends
credibility to the estimates.
Second, while the quality of institutions is important, those associated with
democracy are demonstrably less so. Point estimates for the democracy variable
are statistically significant in only two of the eight specifications, (C5 ) and
(C6 ); and for both they are only marginally significant (at 10 percent level).
Democracy does nonetheless appear to be positively related to income, even after
instrumentation: The coefficients for democratic development are either very
slightly negative or positive, and the positive values range from 0.199 to 0.939. It
is worth noting that the statistically significant coefficient on democracy in (C6 )
comes at the expense of a significant coefficient on the institutions variable. This
outcome could be due to highly correlated measures of both in that particular
subsample.
Third, we find, in contrast to Rodrik et al. (2004), that geography and inte-
14
T
ab
le
4:
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
fo
r
st
at
ic
m
od
el
†
(C
1
)
(C
2
)
(C
3
)
(C
4
)
(C
5
)
(C
6
)
(C
7
)
(C
8
)
In
st
it
ut
io
ns
U
ni
ns
tr
um
en
te
d
0.
83
6
(0
.1
0)
∗∗
∗
Se
tt
le
r
1.
42
3
1.
81
7
1.
83
2
1.
22
8
m
or
ta
lit
y
(0
.6
2)
∗∗
(6
.6
0)
(1
.5
7)
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
9)
∗∗
∗
E
th
no
lin
gu
is
ti
c
0.
35
0
0.
68
3
0.
91
0
fr
ac
ti
on
al
iz
at
io
n
(0
.3
9)
(0
.2
7)
∗∗
(0
.2
0)
∗∗
∗
In
te
gr
at
io
n
0.
01
4
-0
.1
89
-0
.3
29
-0
.2
88
-0
.2
95
0.
11
0
-0
.0
71
-0
.0
61
(0
.1
1)
(0
.3
6)
(1
.5
4)
(0
.2
4)
(0
.1
6)
∗
(0
.2
7)
(0
.1
5)
(0
.1
4)
G
eo
gr
ap
hy
0.
01
4
-0
.0
36
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
16
0.
01
4
0.
01
2
0.
00
5
(0
.0
0)
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
1)
∗
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
1)
∗
(0
.0
1)
D
em
oc
ra
cy
U
ni
ns
tr
um
en
te
d
-0
.0
23
(0
.0
9)
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
1.
00
7
0.
93
9
fr
ac
ti
on
al
iz
at
io
n
(1
.0
9)
(0
.4
9)
∗
M
ili
ta
ry
-0
.3
60
0.
21
6
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e
(6
.7
8)
(0
.2
9)
P
re
di
ct
ed
-0
.0
06
0.
24
3
de
m
oc
ra
cy
(0
.3
5)
(0
.2
0)
A
ll
0.
19
9
(0
.1
1)
∗
R
2
0.
72
9
F
7.
54
∗∗
∗
6.
23
∗∗
∗
8.
09
∗∗
∗
18
.1
1∗
∗∗
27
.7
9∗
∗∗
65
.5
8∗
∗∗
63
.5
9∗
∗∗
H
an
se
n
J
-
-
-
0.
89
1
0.
99
2
3.
74
6∗
5.
93
6∗
∗
N
97
49
46
51
40
88
82
91
†
N
o
te
s:
H
u
b
e
r-
W
h
it
e
(r
o
b
u
st
)
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
A
c
o
n
st
a
n
t
te
rm
w
a
s
in
c
lu
d
e
d
in
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s,
b
u
t
n
o
t
re
p
o
rt
e
d
.
H
a
n
se
n
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
e
x
a
c
tl
y
id
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
m
o
d
e
ls
a
re
re
p
la
c
e
d
w
it
h
a
d
a
sh
.
∗
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
1
0
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l,
∗∗
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
5
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l,
a
n
d
∗∗
∗
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
1
p
e
rc
e
n
t
le
v
e
l.
15
gration are not always “trumped” by institutions. In three of the specifications,
geography enters with a statistically significant coefficient. However, the values
and direction of these estimates are not stable. In particular, the sign appears
to vary in accordance with the specific subsample considered, with the larger
subsample tending to produce the positive coefficients consistent with a priori
theory. Similarly, integration does enter into one specification, (C5 ), with a
marginally significant coefficient, although it is incorrectly signed. Since these
variables are neither the focus of our study, nor do they show up in sufficient
specifications, we reserve judgment on these apparent inconsistencies. We do
note, however, that such counterintuitive results were also found by Rodrik et al.
(2004).
Fourth, only when we utilize the predicted level of democracy do we yield
Anderson LR test statistics (not reported) that reject the null of underidentifi-
cation (χ2 = 2.982, p-value = 0.084). This result suggests that instrumenting
with predicted democracy provides a better fit, which validates our choice of
predicted democracy as the instrument of choice for democratic development
(see also Table 2 and Figure 3).
To test the robustness of these findings, Table 5 reports results from a range
of robustness checks performed to ascertain the main finding that the political
regime, once properly instrumented, does not affect economic performance. The
perturbations have been chosen to follow, in the main, those performed in Rodrik
et al. (2004). These can be classified into two broad categories: (a) Robustness
to other deep determinants of growth, such as the legal system (whether this
has origins from French civil law or English common law); and (b) Robustness
to alternative measures of the key deep determinants.
The specifications are, for other deep determinants as controls: (Ra1 ) Inclu-
sion of regional dummies for Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and East Asia;
(Ra2 ) Inclusion of an indicator variable that takes on unity when the legal sys-
tem has French legal origin; (Ra3 ) Inclusion of an indicator variable that takes
on unity when the country was once a colony that was classified by Acemoglu
et al. (2001) as neo-European (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand); (Ra4 ) Inclusion of an indicator variable that takes on unity when the
country was at war in 1995; (Ra5 ) Inclusion of an indicator variable that takes
on unity when the country experienced a revolution or a coup in 1995; (Ra6 )
Inclusion of an indicator variable that takes on unity when the country is an oil
exporter, as classified by the IMF.
The specifications for alternative measures are: (Rb1 ) Inclusion of a variable
measuring tropical land area; (Rb2 ) Inclusion of an indicator variable that takes
on unity when the country is landlocked; (Rb3 ) Inclusion of an index measuring
the prevalence of malaria; (Rb4 ) Instrumenting integration with a measure of
real openness, taken to be trade openness in PPP terms; (Rb5 ) Instrumenting
integration with the Sachs & Warner (1995) measure of trade policy openness;
and (Rb6 ) Inclusion of two proxies for market size, land area and population.
Where possible, we have reported results for the larger sample using ethno-
linguistic fractionalization as instruments for institutions. However, when these
instruments failed the Hansen J-test for overidentification, we have reported
16
instead the specification that instruments institutions with settler mortality
(which is exactly identified). We also explored additional controls and alterna-
tive specifications, such as frost days per year (additional geography control)
and colonizer identity (additional deep determinant), but these did not produce
substantially different outcomes.
The general message that one obtains from the robustness checks is that
democracy does not exert a significant influence on economic performance across
the cross section of countries. The coefficient on democracy is not statistically
significant across all specifications, and the sign on these coefficients are also
not stable.
The quality of institutions continues to be a positive, and significant, fun-
damental determinant, a result consistent with Rodrik et al. (2004). However,
physical geography does appear to be marginally significant for some specifica-
tions, although these enter with the incorrect sign. However, the coefficient on
the malarial incidence index—the results for (Rb3 )—is negative and significant,
a result that has been replicated by Sachs (2003) and Carstensen & Gundlach
(2006). If disease ecology is the moderating variable by which underdevelop-
ment occurs, then, geography cannot be ruled out as an important determinant
to cross-country economic growth outcomes.
Depending on the specification, other determinants do seem to matter. For
example, oil-exporting countries do appear to perform better, which suggests
that there remains aspects of the African experience that are not captured by
the simple empirical model given by (1). Keeping in mind the negative (though
insignificant) coefficient on sub-Saharan Africa, this finding casts doubt on the
notion that the resource curse applies uniformly to all natural resources.
3.4 Dynamic Model Results
Table 6 presents the summary statistics for GDP per capita for the larger panel
data. The results for mean levels of GDP per capita for democracies versus non-
democracies are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 3. The standard
deviations for per capita GDP for democracies is, however, much smaller; this
statistic implies that, for the panel, democracies possess both higher average
levels of GDP per capita together with lower variability.
The benchmark results for the panel are reported in Table 7. These corre-
spond to: (P1 ) OLS regression of GDP per capita on lagged GDP per capita
and levels of institutions, integration, geography, and democracy given by (1);
(P2 ) Fixed effects regression of specification (P1 ); (P3 ) System GMM estima-
tion of (P1 ), with lagged GDP per capita, integration, institutions, and democ-
racy instrumented by one-period lagged GMM-style instruments and geography
treated as an IV-style instrument; (P4 ) (P3 ), but with time dummies included
as IV-style instruments; (P5 )–(P6 ) (P4 ), with varying structures of the deep
determinants, and instrumented by level through two-period GMM-style lags of
the endogenous variables and both geography and time dummies as exogenous
IV-style instruments; (P7 )–(P8 ) Analogous to (P5 )–(P6 ), but with a two and
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Table 5: Robustness regressions of GDP per capita for static model†
(Ra1) (Ra2) (Ra3) (Ra4) (Ra5) (Ra6)
Institutions 1.999 1.053 1.569 1.859 1.879 1.618
(0.99)∗∗ (0.23)∗∗∗ (0.62)∗∗ (0.60)∗∗∗ (0.64)∗∗∗ (0.47)∗∗∗
Integration
Openness -0.337 -0.051 -0.340 -0.326 -0.270 -0.112
(0.32) (0.13) (0.31) (0.27) (0.25) (0.22)
Geography
Equatorial -0.027 0.003 -0.013 -0.021 -0.022 -0.016
distance (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Democracy -0.409 0.183 -0.058 -0.058 -0.028 0.121
(0.70) (0.20) (0.35) (0.40) (0.37) (0.27)
Region
Latin 0.355
America (0.40)
Sub-Saharan -0.432
Africa (0.47)
East Asia -0.460
(1.03)
Legal system 0.229
(0.13)∗
Neo-Europe -0.777
(0.64)
War 0.301
(0.34)
Revolution/coup 0.386
(0.58)
Oil exporter 0.447
(0.24)∗
F 5.30∗∗∗ 49.70∗∗∗ 43.30∗∗∗ 6.30∗∗∗ 6.33∗∗∗ 7.97∗∗∗
Hansen J - 1.338 2.073 - - -
N 51 91 91 50 50 51
(Rb1) (Rb2) (Rb3) (Rb4) (Rb5) (Rb6)
Institutions 1.849 1.671 0.650 2.692 1.534 1.129
(0.54)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗ (0.18)∗∗∗ (1.62)∗ (0.29)∗∗∗ (0.23)∗∗∗
Integration
Openness -0.375 -0.384 -0.039 -0.105
(0.28) (0.19)∗∗ (0.11) (0.44)
Real openness -1.091
(1.04)
Trade policy -1.110
(0.49)∗∗
Geography
Equatorial -0.031 -0.032 0.002 -0.062 -0.024 -0.001
distance (0.02) (0.01)∗∗ (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Tropics 0.193
(0.51)
Landlocked -0.556
(0.35)
Malaria -0.983
(0.19)∗∗∗
Democracy 0.215 0.184 0.213 -0.348 0.048 0.104
(0.26) (0.20) (0.15) (0.79) (0.25) (0.19)
Land area -0.000
(0.00)
Population 0.028
(0.11)
F 6.78∗∗∗ 10.35∗∗∗ 75.05∗∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗ 13.28∗∗∗ 15.18∗∗∗
Hansen J - - 0.097 - 1.016 0.033
N 50 50 85 50 60 51
† Notes: Huber-White (robust) standard errors reported in parentheses. A constant term was
included in the regressions, but not reported. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗
indicates significance at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for GDP per capita for
panel†
Democratic Nondemocratic
Mean 8.966 8.007
Standard deviation 0.955 1.108
Minimum 6.589 5.806
Maximum 10.445 10.507
N 1131 960
†
Notes: Democracies were classified as those with democracy
level greater than 5, on a scale of 0–10, as given in the Polity
IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2005).
four-period lag structure.11
The results for the dynamic model are notable for their strong corrobora-
tion of the main findings in Section 3.3. As before, institutions appear to be
an important fundamental determinant of GDP per capita. With the exception
of specification (P7 ), the level coefficient for institutions enters with a positive
and statistically significant coefficient. In addition, the magnitudes are also
economically significant, and comparable to that of the static model: The aver-
age over all specifications is e0.065 = 1.067.12 For the specifications with lagged
variables—(P5 )–(P8 )—the coefficients tend to be negative (although not always
significant), which suggests that the long-run impact of institutions is weaker
than its short-run impact. At first glance, this finding is somewhat surprising,
since it is often assumed that the positive impact of strong institutions takes
time to diffuse throughout the economy. However, to the extent that weak insti-
tutions exert a real, immediate cost on growth, the muted latter-period effects
of institutions on income may be less surprising.
Second, democracy is, as before, largely irrelevant as a fundamental de-
terminant of growth. The coefficients are mostly indistinguishable from zero,
and in the two specifications where they are significant, the high z scores for
the Arellano-Bond test suggests that, with AR(2) autocorrelation still present,
there is a possibility of misspecification in the GMM-style instruments. In ad-
dition, the signs of the level coefficients for democracy are no longer stable. As
was the case in (C6 ), the significance of democracy in (P7 ) could once again
be due to correlated measures of institutions and democracy in the particular
subsample.
11We have chosen not to run two-step GMM due to well-known finite-sample problems
associated with the standard errors of two-step estimates. Indeed, two-step estimates of the
model (not reported) suggest significant downward bias in the standard errors, even after
effecting the Windmeijer (2005) correction.
12As described in the Appendix, the natural log is taken for the alternative measure of
institutions used for the dynamic model.
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Third, and in contrast to the static model, both geography and integration
appear to be positive determinants of GDP per capita. While these variables are
not always statistically or economically significant, their consistency with their
theoretically-expected signs is reassuring. As before, our results are indicative of
the fact that the primacy of institutions does not mean that other fundamental
determinants, especially geography, are no longer relevant. This finding also
provides some partial vindication of the view of Sachs (2001, 2003), which argues
that geography remains an important fundamental determinant, independent of
the intervening effects of institutional quality.
Fourth, the results in (P1 ) and (P2 ) underscore the importance of taking
into account endogeneity issues in estimates of (1). While it initially appears
that most fundamental determinants (save democracy) are significant determi-
nants of GDP per capita, controlling for possible endogeneity causes measures
of integration to completely fall out of the picture (except in the two-period lag
of (P8 ), where it enters with a wrong sign), while also weakening the influence
of geography. We note, however, that coefficient estimates for specification (P1 )
and (P2 ) are biased upward and downward, respectively, and hence for the the-
oretical upper and lower bounds that can be used as a check on integrity of the
estimates from the other specifications (Bond 2002).
Tests of the robustness of the dynamic model are reported in Tables 8a and
8b. As far as possible, we have sought to introduce analogous perturbations
to those in Table 5. As in Table 5, these can be classified into the categories:
(a) Robustness to other deep determinants; and (b) Robustness to alternative
measures of deep determinants.13
For each robustness check, we ran the three specifications corresponding
to (P4 )–(P6 ) (reported as sub-specifications 1–3 in Tables 8a and 8b). The
specific perturbations are as follows: (Ta1 ) Inclusion of regional dummies for
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and East Asia; (Ta2 ) (Ra2 ) Inclusion of
an indicator variable for a history of French colonization; (Ta3 ) Inclusion of an
indicator variable for neo-Europe; (Ta4 ) Inclusion of an indicator variable for
oil exporters. The specifications for alternative measures are: (Tb1 ) Inclusion
of a variable measuring tropical area; (Tb2 ) Inclusion of an indicator variable
for landlocked countries; (Tb3 ) Substitution of the institutions variable with
the governance measure in Kaufmann et al. (2007); (Tb4 ) Substitution of the
democracy variable with the freedom index in Freedom House (2007).
The robustness tests do not change the primary finding of this paper: The
political regime, once properly instrumented, does not affect economic perfor-
mance, insofar as compared to other fundamental determinants of growth. This
is regardless of the specific measure that we have chosen, since the coefficient
on democracy remains insignificant even with an alternative measure (as seen
from the results in (Tb4 )). Several other findings, however, are of interest, and
so will be discussed briefly.
13In the interests of space, we have chosen to limit the number of reported robustness tests,
as well as test diagnostics. The covariates included in Tables 8a and 8b were chosen based
on theoretical as well as statistical significance (consistent with Table 5), and all reported
specifications passed the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation.
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Table 8a: Robustness regressions of GDP per capita to other deep de-
terminants for dynamic model†
(Ta11) (Ta12) (Ta13) (Ta21) (Ta22) (Ta23)
GDP per capita
One-period 0.986 0.986 0.977 0.995 0.990 0.984
lag (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Geography -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)∗ (0.00)∗
Integration
Level -0.000 0.029 0.004 0.003 0.031 0.005
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
One-period -0.014 0.007 -0.012 0.007
lag (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Two-period -0.006 -0.005
lag (0.02) (0.02)
Institutions
Level 0.037 0.091 0.109 0.033 0.091 0.113
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗
One-period -0.060 0.001 -0.055 0.002
lag (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.02)∗∗ (0.05)
Two-period -0.068 -0.068
lag (0.04)∗ (0.03)∗
Democracy
Level -0.001 0.015 0.016 -0.000 0.013 0.016
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
One-period -0.011 0.002 -0.013 -0.001
lag (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Two-period -0.010 -0.010
lag (0.02) (0.02)
Regional dummies
Latin -0.053 -0.035 -0.050
America (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Sub-Saharan -0.028 -0.027 -0.033
Africa (0.01)∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
East Asia -0.004 0.009 -0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Colonizer
British -0.007 0.005 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
French -0.023 -0.020 -0.022
(0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗
Sargan χ2 115.35 113.14 110.42 109.97 109.33 113.05
N 1938 1938 1794 1938 1938 1794
(Ta31) (Ta32) (Ta33) (Ta41) (Ta42) (Ta43)
GDP per capita
One-period 0.999 0.992 0.986 0.995 0.995 0.986
lag (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Geography 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.00)∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)∗
Integration
Level -0.003 0.030 0.005 0.002 0.031 0.005
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
One-period -0.014 0.009 -0.015 0.009
lag (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Two-period -0.008 -0.008
lag (0.02) (0.02)
Institutions
Level 0.038 0.089 0.114 0.032 0.090 0.114
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗
One-period -0.053 -0.001 -0.061 -0.001
lag (0.02)∗∗ (0.05) (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.05)
Two-period -0.069 -0.069
lag (0.04)∗ (0.04)∗
Democracy
Level 0.001 0.014 0.016 0.001 0.013 0.017
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
One-period -0.011 -0.000 -0.013 -0.001
lag (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Two-period -0.009 -0.009
lag (0.02) (0.02)
Neo-Europe -0.161 -0.058 -0.003
(0.10)∗ (0.04) (0.02)
Oil exporter 0.013 -0.014 0.001
(0.01) (0.01)∗ (0.01)
Sargan χ2 106.50 109.75 109.33 116.63 110.61 111.56
N 1938 1938 1794 1938 1938 1794
† Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust (asymptotic) standard errors re-
ported in parentheses. Estimates adjusted for finite sample and orthogonal deviations.
A constant term and time dummies were included in the regressions, but not reported.
∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5 percent level,
and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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Table 8b: Robustness regressions of GDP per capita to alternative
measures for dynamic model‡
(Tb11) (Tb12) (Tb13) (Tb21) (Tb22) (Tb23)
GDP per capita
One-period 0.994 0.986 0.979 0.995 0.991 0.985
lag (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Geography -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)∗ (0.00) (0.00)∗ (0.00)∗
Tropics -0.026 -0.040 -0.043
(0.02) (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Landlocked -0.015 -0.012 -0.013
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Integration
Level 0.003 0.030 0.005 0.003 0.031 0.004
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
One-period -0.010 0.006 -0.013 0.010
lag (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Two-period -0.001 -0.007
lag (0.02) (0.02)
Institutions
Level 0.026 0.086 0.111 0.031 0.090 0.113
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗
One-period -0.060 -0.002 -0.056 0.001
lag (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.02)∗∗ (0.05)
Two-period -0.071 -0.069
lag (0.03)∗∗ (0.03)∗
Democracy
Level 0.001 0.015 0.017 0.000 0.015 0.017
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
One-period -0.010 0.001 -0.013 -0.000
lag (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Two-period -0.008 -0.010
lag (0.02) (0.02)
Sargan χ2 108.33 108.91 106.04 107.79 113.53 112.06
N 1938 1938 1794 1938 1938 1794
(Tb31) (Tb32) (Tb33) (Tb41) (Tb42) (Tb43)
GDP per capita
One-period 1.033 1.024 0.987 0.993 0.992 0.992
lag (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.03)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗
Geography -0.011 -0.011 0.015 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Integration
Level 0.058 0.041 0.023 0.001 0.012 0.010
(0.03)∗ (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
One-period 0.021 0.017 -0.006 -0.011
lag (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Two-period 0.005 0.006
lag (0.05) (0.01)
Institutions
Political 0.041 0.084 0.075
stability (0.02)∗∗ (0.04)∗ (0.04)∗
One-period -0.037 -0.034
lag (0.03) (0.03)
Two-period 0.002
lag (0.01)
Governance -0.011 0.067 0.116
(0.05) (0.04)∗ (0.04)∗∗∗
One-period -0.054 -0.098
lag (0.04) (0.07)
Two-period 0.016
lag (0.04)
Democracy
Polity 0.032 -0.019 -0.028
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
One-period 0.031 0.031
lag (0.02) (0.02)∗
Two-period -0.048
lag (0.04)
Freedom 0.004 -0.000 0.009
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
One-period 0.009 -0.022
lag (0.02) (0.02)
Two-period 0.018
lag (0.02)
Sargan χ2 21.09 40.15 23.74 121.20 118.42 121.24
N 558 558 410 2123 2123 1991
‡ Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust (asymptotic) standard errors
reported in parentheses. Estimates adjusted for finite sample and orthogonal devia-
tions. A constant term and time dummies were included in the regressions, but not
reported. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ indicates significance at 5
percent level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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Institutions continue to feature prominently as a significant, positive deter-
minant of growth. As before, the positive effect of institutions diminishes over
time, although this effect is not consistently significant across all specifications.
Importantly, this result is robust to the alternative measure of institutions that
we employ: Institutions, as measured by governance, exerts a positive and sig-
nificant effect in (Tb32 ) and (Tb33 ), although in this case the lagged effects are
not significant.
Likewise, physical geography does seem to exert an impact on growth out-
comes, at least in some specifications. Equatorial distance is positive and signif-
icant in (Ta3 ), and conversely, a larger tropical area reduces GDP per capita—
see (Tb1 )—in a significant and negative fashion. However, integration does not
appear to survive the robustness checks. It enters with a positive sign in only
one specification, (Tb31 ), and only marginally so.
Finally, we note that other additional deep determinants, especially regional
dummies and colonial history, do seem to make a difference. The former result
is similar to the findings in Section 3.3, although in this case the dummy for sub-
Saharan Africa is not just negative but also statistically significant. The negative
coefficient on the dummy for French legal origin is not entirely inconsistent with
those of other researchers (Acemoglu et al. 2001), who have argued that British
colonies tend to perform better in part because of Britain’s care in colonizing
locations where settlements were possible, which led to British colonies that
were not merely extractive, but instead allowed for the development of better
institutions.
4 Conclusion
Critics of democracies often suggest that democratic pressures are inimical to
economic growth, while its strongest proponents tend to overemphasize the role
of democracy.14 On the surface, the anecdotal evidence seems to support the
case of the former: China’s sustained rate of growth in GDP, averaging 8 percent
or more over two decades, was achieved while the country was under the rule of
an authoritarian regime; while India, the world’s largest democracy, had a far
more modest record, with poverty rates today still about twice that of China.
The more nuanced view, however, is that democracy is neither necessary
nor sufficient to ensure economic performance, nor does it need to be a “cruel
dilemma” (Bhagwati 2002). Indeed, it sees that any growth-enhancing effects of
democracy are conditional on a policy that includes a combination of market-
orientated growth strategies—perhaps embodied in pro-growth institutions—
and trade openness. (Bhagwati 2002, pp. 151–152) offers a candid explanation:
Democracy is not necessarily better for development. Only when
14Lee Kwan Yew, the architect of Singapore’s rapid rise from a riot-ridden, malaria-infested
tropical island to one of the world’s richest nations (in per capita terms), has even argued
that “what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy. The exuberance
of democracy leads to indiscipline and disorderly conduct which are inimical to development”
(Lee 2000, p. 304).
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combined with markets and openness does democracy offer the best
prospect of achieving the efficient, dynamic society that allows de-
velopment to thrive.
This paper has sought unpack the definition of “institutions,” in order to
provide empirical evidence behind the roles that political-economic and purely
political institutions play as fundamental drivers of growth. Once we take into
account the econometric problems arising from endogeneity, and controlling for
other deep determinants such as economic integration and physical geography,
our main finding is that (political-economic) institutions exert a significant im-
pact on the level of income, whereas the political instituion of democracy is in-
significant. Although similar to the findings in Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2006),
our result that democracy is insignificant is stable across both cross-sectional
and panel data. In a crude sense, while economic freedom appears to be crucial
for successful economic performance, political freedom is not.
One explanation for this apparent paradox is to recognize the nonlinearity
of the expansion of democratic rights. While extensions of political participa-
tion may induce faster growth or retard economic development, in either case,
this occurs only up to a certain point (Barro 1996). This nonlinearity can also
be used to rationalize the potential tension—as highlighted in the theoretical
literature—between a democratic regime as a positive force for economic devel-
opment versus the negative effects of democracies. Minier (2007) has recently
studied nonlinearities in the effects of institutions (generally defined) on growth.
Future work would extend this to allow for nonlinear democratic development
as well. Indeed, it may well be the case that, in a sufficiently diverse sample,
these two contrary effects cancel each other out, resulting in a net zero impact
from democracy. Although we are unable to draw strong conclusions regarding
the desirability of democracy or autocracy in fostering development, to assert
that the political regime does not matter seems, to us, an unwarranted, extreme
conclusion. More generally, additional research is needed to understand the the-
oretical drivers behind how political-economic and political institutions affect
growth.
Nonetheless, as far as enhancing economic performance is concerned, devel-
oping countries may be far better served by concentrating on improving the
quality of political-economic institutions that exert a more direct, first-order in-
fluence on the functioning of market processes—such as the rule of law (La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1998) and the enforcement of property rights
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes & Shleifer 2002)—rather than expanding
their energies on building participatory political institutions. While it is tempt-
ing to claim the policy implication that promoting democratic development is
therefore irrelevant, doing so would disregard the tremendous value afforded—in
terms of individual freedom and political representation—by democracy per se.
It seems unwise to substitute such intangibles in favor of growth, at any cost.
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Appendix
This appendix discusses in greater detail various variables employed in the re-
gression analyses.
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization involved the use of two variables that cap-
ture the fraction of the population speaking English, and the fraction of the
population speaking other European languages.
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The measure of institutions using Kaufmann et al. (2007) included the fol-
lowing variables: Voice and accountability, political stability, government effec-
tiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The esti-
mates were assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution centered on zero
with support [−1, 1]. We dropped the first of these—which seems to be a better
proxy for democratic representation—and equally weight the remaining of these
5 dimensions in the composite score:
INSi = 0.2 Stabi + 0.2 Govi + 0.2 Regi + 0.2 Lawi + 0.2 Corrupti.
The composite measure using Political Risk Services (2003) included very similar
variables: Bureaucracy quality, corruption, government stability, and rule of
law. These were scored from 0–12 for government stability, 0–6 for corruption
and rule of law, and 0–4 for bureaucracy quality. The composite was thus the
log transform
INSit = ln (3×Bureauit + 2× Corruptit +Govit + 2× Lawit) .
The alternative democracy variable provided by Freedom House (2007) is a
composite of two main variables: Political rights, and civil liberties. The for-
mer comprise electoral process, political pluralism, and government functioning,
while the latter comprise freedom of expression, associational rights, rule of law,
and personal autonomy. Each variable is scored from 1–7 and weighted equally
according to
DEMit = 0.5 Rightsit + 0.5 Libit.
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